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Thinking, the Unconscious and Film
  John Carvalho 
Abstract
In this essay, we explore a non-standard model of the
unconscious, what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call the
“productive unconscious,” to correct the too-often reductive
tendencies of psychoanalysis and film. This introduces the
image of a form of thinking we may find in our encounters with
film that aims more at pleasure-taking than problem-solving
and that, in so doing, really gets us to think. Drawing on this
productive unconscious, we come to a richer appreciation of
classic Hollywood cinema, a new understanding of classic,
nouveau vague and neo-realist films, and we enjoy the chance
to ignore the rules and reconsider thinking in philosophy and
film.
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1. Introduction
Discussions of the unconscious and film generally stick to the
Freudian standard. [1]Drawing on the insights of Freud’s first
major work, these discussions, implicitly or explicitly, present
films as the projection of a dream world. [2] The experience of
watching a film is taken in these discussions to be
commensurate with the dreamer’s dark encounter with a
manifest stream of images whose latent associations and
meanings are waiting for interpretation by a special, analytic
technique. Of course, dreams are only one example of the
unconscious and, however suggestive this model may be for
the experience of watching films or for the efforts of film
makers to capture the splendor of dreams on the motion
picture screen, interpretations of films that bend to the
authority of the orthodox Freudian standard are often
redundant and doctrinaire. They thoughtlessly “uncover” a
significance for the film worked out in advance by
psychoanalytic theory and frequently tell us more about that
theory than about the film.
This is unfortunate. Not only does it compromise our
understanding of particular films and film in general; it also
cheapens our understanding of the unconscious and of our
thoughtful engagement with film. Even further, especially for
an philosophical audience, it limits our understanding of
thinking itself or, more specifically, of a kind of thinking we
might otherwise enjoy in our thoughtful encounters with film.
In this essay, we will explore a non-standard model of the
unconscious, what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call the
“productive unconscious,” and show how that model can
inform our understanding of film in general. At the same time,
we will show how this productive unconscious can lead us to
consider a way of thinking that we neglect at our peril, a way
of thinking that aims more at pleasure than problem- solving
and that, in so doing, really gets us to think.
This interpretive strategy is not arbitrary. It is suggested, as a
corrective to the application of orthodox psychoanalytic theory
to the interpretation of film, and it is recommended by the
chance it affords us to clarify the “time-image,” a concept
created by Deleuze to distinguish post-war European film from
its American counterpart. No one yet has noticed the
connection between the conjunctive syntheses of the
productive unconscious and this image Deleuze says certain
film makers use to think. It is part of the point of this essay to
argue that the difference in the way some post-war European
film makers think with time-images is comparable to the
difference in thought captured by the conjunctive syntheses of
the productive unconscious. In both cases, we are introduced
to a way of thinking that takes its pleasure from the way it is
“forced” to abandon the prescribed protocols for thinking, and
follow an association of ideas characteristic of the primary
processes of the unconscious, the significations of a manifest
content before its latent “secret” has been revealed by
analysis.
In this essay, then, we will (1) outline the terms of the
productive unconscious, (2) demonstrate the efficacy of the
syntheses of this productive unconscious in the interpretation
of parts of several different films, (3) contrast the function of
an orthodox unconscious in a recent Hollywood film with the
function of the productive unconscious in the interpretation of
a classic New Wave film, and (4) end with some conclusions
about the value of the productive unconscious for
understanding what it might mean to think when, precisely,
we do not know what or how to think. In this way, we will
show how our experience with film, and specifically with an
image of time in film, can bring us into contact with an
alternative model of the unconscious and a different image of
thinking than we ordinarily entertain.
2. The Productive Unconscious
Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between connective,
disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses in their revisionist
interpretation of what orthodox psychoanalysis ultimately
reduced to the id. [3] On the standard Freudian view, the id is
the source of the desires which the ego seeks to harness to
satisfy the physical needs of the body, on the one hand, and
the psychical needs of a stable identity, on the other. [4] On
this same view, what the body wants is complicated by the
censoring mechanism of the super-ego, which insists on the
repression of those desires deemed detrimental to the life of
the individual and the species. According to Freud, this
dynamic of desire and interdiction is represented in the drama
of Oedipus which structures, for the best, the phylogeny and
ontogeny of human kind.
Where Freud sees a theater of desire and deferred satisfaction,
however, Deleuze and Guattari see the libidinal cathexes of a
productive unconscious, and where Freud sees the neurotic
drama of Oedipus as inevitable, Deleuze and Guattari see the
psychotic out for a walk as a point of departure for
overcoming the Oedipal impasse. The psychotic does not
produce desires that cannot be satisfied and must be
repressed, Deleuze and Guattari say, but a “desiring
production” that does not need or lack satisfaction or paranoid
repression. They introduce the connective, disjunctive and
conjunctive syntheses to account for this way of putting
Oedipus out of play. For Deleuze and Guattari, desiring
production is an account of the unconscious as a process which
advances on Freud’s psychoanalytic model by incorporating the
political economy of Karl Marx and the libidinal economy of
Friedrich Nietzsche. In this essay we stop short of a discussion
of Marx and Nietzsche and attempt, instead, to show how this
model of the unconscious can alert us to a difference that
happens in the way we think in certain encounters of
philosophy with film.
For these syntheses to model for us a difference in the way we
think in certain encounters of philosophy and film, we need to
know something more about them. For the purposes of this
essay, we will describe connective syntheses as the linking
together of what psychoanalysis calls “partial objects” – a
mouth, a breast, for example – in a chain that does not
complete these objects or make them whole but that
establishes a flux or flow of desire that connects them with
one another and with other flows. The flow of milk in the
newborn’s mouth is connected to the flow of blood through his
mother’s breast, is connected to the flow of nutrients passing
through the mother’s small intestine, is connected to the flow
of food through her mouth, is connected, through a chain of
many more partial objects, to the flows of agriculture and
animal husbandry, to the flows, ultimately, of rain and wind
and sunlight on the earth that make plants grow, animals
reproduce, and so on. The same flows, of course, pass in
another direction from the child’s mouth to his stomach and,
through the digestive process, into his blood, through the
processes of elimination into his bowel, through the household
plumbing into a septic system, and so on, again. Of course,
these seemingly singular flows connecting the wind and the
rain and the sunlight on the earth through the child nursing at
his mother’s breast back to the earth once more are
connected to many, many other flows connecting the mother
to the father, the father to his own mother, the child to his
siblings and to other children and their families and so forth.
Connective syntheses produce links between the multiplicity of
constituents in our bodies, the multiplicity of elements in the
natural environment, the multiplicity of individuals imbricated
in our personal lives, our social interactions, our world, the
planet, the universe and whatever there may be beyond.
Disjunctive syntheses are part of the same process of
production. At the level of the unconscious, the connective
syntheses couple an overfullness of desire to points of
discharge for desire. The mouth that connects with a breast
now connects with a thumb and now, again, with a volume of
air. A finger that couples with a ring and now taps on a
keyboard now, again, twirls a lock of hair. The disjunctive
syntheses contribute to this process by producing a surface,
the so-called “Body without Organs,” on which these
connections are inscribed and recorded by signs that code the
flows they link as belonging to eating or sucking or breathing,
on the one hand, ornamentation or writing or curling, on the
other. [5] But while the truth tables of bivalent logic require us
to treat disjunctions as exclusive, Deleuze and Guattari would
have us understand disjunctive syntheses inclusively. On this
model, eating is not distinct and exclusive from but distinct
and included in the process of sucking, distinct and included in
the act of breathing. So coded and recorded, the mouth which
we ordinarily take to be a sucking machine or an eating
machine or a speaking machine or a singing machine is not the
exclusive point of passage for food or milk or language or
music but inclusively the point of passage for all these flows.
More importantly, by recording these connections, the
disjunctive syntheses draw maps on which hitherto unexplored
flows can be explored, defeating the tendency of desire to
ossify in fixed patterns. The recording surface of the
disjunctive syntheses provides an unexpected resource for the
production of ever new connections (of milk and music, for
example, or of eating, breathing, speaking, whistling and
kissing).
Conjunctive syntheses, according to Deleuze and Guattari,
bring this process of production to an end. The full implications
of these syntheses would take us far from our theme. Suffice it
to say, here, that the conjunctive syntheses produce the end
of production in the double sense of being its final state,
consumption, and its realization, consummation (as sex was
once thought to consummate a marriage). According to the
psychoanalytic tradition Deleuze and Guattari reject, the
connection of the newborn with his mother’s breast naturally
leads to an exclusive disjunction of partners motivated by a
heterosexual desire to reproduce more of the same, more
newborns and mothers to nurse them. Deviations from this
natural path are called perversions, and failures to incorporate
perversions into a pattern of normal, reproductive sex are
manifested as neuroses. For Freud, this is how we come to be
who we are, both as individuals and as a species. Deleuze and
Guattari think there is another way.
For becoming normal or neurotic (the only options in the
Freudian scheme), they recommend becoming intense, a way
of consummating or realizing desiring production that captures
what is for them the force and preferred character of the
conjunctive synthesis. The psychotic, for example, born of a
mother known to all as Margaret, associates his mother,
excessively and erroneously, with Mary, the mother of God,
making him a god, and exempting him from reproduction and
entitling him, instead, to pleasures without end, intensities
that never exhaust themselves and that realize him as the
divinity he is becoming. Such intensities are characteristic of
what Deleuze and Guattari call the productive psychoses of the
conjunctive syntheses, a form of schizophrenia they distinguish
vigorously from false associations with split or multiple
personality disorders, on the one hand and, on the other, from
the damaging image of a devastated soul incapable of
managing her or his own affairs. The voices in his head, the
hallucinations before her eyes, the delusions of grandeur that
occupy him are symptoms, they say, of the schizophrenic’s
refusal to conform to the standards of Oedipus and signs of
her different ability to navigate the death drive and enjoy
those pleasures not limited by an economy of satisfaction.
These psychoses are positive and productive, Deleuze and
Guattari say, because they produce a desiring that does not
want satisfaction in place of desires that can never be
satisfied. What we will come to, in what follows, is a kind of
thinking in philosophy and film that draws on the positive and
productive intensities presented by these conjunctive
syntheses.
3. The Connective and Disjunctive Syntheses in Film
The connective syntheses that link elements on the motion
picture screen and direct the flows of narrative and desire on it
are multiple and varied. The links that connect characters in
the film and direct actions among them are the most obvious
of these syntheses. They connect characters to one another
but also to the story those characters are enacting and that
directs the flows of narrative through them. They also link this
narrative to narratives about the actors playing these parts
and to the narratives connecting all the characters played by
these actors. We can say the same for directors, camera
women and men, for whole production companies, but
confining ourselves to the cinematic image as it unfolds on the
screen, we can point out syntheses directing flows among the
different camera shots used to make the images that tell the
story on that screen. Establishing shots are connected to
close-ups by the context they provide for the image of some
detail relevant to the narrative. Close-ups also often tell us
what a character feels in the course of an action captured in
mid-range shots.
The partial objects connected in the viewer’s thoughts about
what she sees on the screen may be images of parts of the
film connected to images from the same or different films
connected to thoughts about what she has seen, which are
themselves multiply and variously connected. The synthetic
concept she draws from this thinking about the film is a
directed linking of some of these elements. These connections
and the concepts synthesized in them can become rigid and
predictable. We know in advance what one critic or another will
think of this or that film, and readers of these critics, often
without thinking for themselves, ventriloquize their
interpretations. If we have a record of these syntheses,
however, we can follow the connections they have made and
map new and unexplored links to elements not heretofore
considered.
The disjunctive syntheses, on the model we are borrowing
from Deleuze and Guattari, produce a surface for recording
and linking connective syntheses in inclusive flows of desire
and thought. In Casablanca (1942), Rick is connected to Victor
Laszlo to the Resistance to the letters of transit through Ilsa.
He is connected to Ilsa to Paris to American isolationism to the
letters of transit, again, through Sam. He is connected to
Vichy France to Major Strasser to Nazi Germany to the letters
of transit, yet again, through Captain Renault, and so on. The
recording surface of the disjunctive syntheses maps Rick’s
connection to the letters of transit through Ilsa or Sam or
Renault in an inclusive synthesis of co-present paths rather
than as exclusive possible options. It also allows us to plot
relatively unexplored connections between Rick and Laszlo,
Rick and Sam, Rick and Renault against the dominant
synthesis connecting Rick and Ilsa. This thinking about
Casablanca remains latent in the unconscious until it is made
manifest in a fully articulated interpretation of the film.
Much of what philosophers think about in their encounters with
films amounts to connecting potentially disparate and oblique
elements as they appear on the movie screen to tell a
coherent story about human life and about the relations of
men and women in their interactions with one another. In
Pursuits of Happiness and Contesting Tears, Stanley Cavell
famously explores the distinct but complementary genres of
remarriage comedies and melodramas of the missing woman
in Hollywood films of the 1930s and ‘40s. [6] Cavell studies
the comedies of remarriage in films like The Philadelphia Story,
Bringing Up Baby and It Happened One Night to ask whether
romance in a marriage can survive a relationship defined by a
connection of equality, friendship and mutual respect for the
intelligence and accomplishments of both parties. In his
thinking about these films, Cavell asks us to explore the
connection between knowing someone and loving them: can
we love someone we know, and is love a form of knowledge?
In films like Gaslight, Now, Voyager and Stella Dallas, Cavell
inclusively synthesizes the melodrama’s only latent connection
of this same quest for equality of opportunity and
accomplishment for men and women to the isolation of women
and to the way the men in these films, and the men in the
audiences for these films, conspire to enforce this isolation.
Women who want the moon are made to settle for the stars.
This is not an example of philosophy subordinating film to its
own terms but of Cavell thinking differently as a result of the
connections he discovers in films and by virtue of an inclusive
synthesis he forges between philosophy and film in general. As
William Rothman and Marian Keane recount it,
The World Viewed is one kind of thing that can
be said about film. By investigating,
philosophically, the obscure promptings of this
expression, the motivations of its own writing,
The World Viewed enables us to know something
about the kind of object film is, and something
about what philosophy is, as well. [7]
Cavell’s reflections on remarriage comedies and Hollywood
melodramas appear to exemplify, even if he might not put it
this way, a disjunctive synthesis of philosophy and film,
charting flows that move from an articulation of the ontological
features of film to what can be said about comedies and
weepies, in one direction, and from reflections on the narrative
content of film to musings about what there is to say about
philosophy, in the other. In Cavell’s case, his reflections on
film link him beyond his immediate chain of references to
think philosophically about the writings of André Bazin, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and even Deleuze and Guattari. At the same
time, of course, Emerson and the late Wittgenstein remain
privileged links in this chain, allowing Cavell to “keep faith”
with the methodological principle “that we can find out what
kind of object anything is by investigating expressions which
show the kinds of thing said about it.” [8] While providing a
pretty good example of what a disjunctive synthesis of
philosophy and film might look like, Cavell’s philosophical
commitments lead him to forge links that direct the flows of
his thinking to selected ends. If we could extend these flows
and connect them to ever more unexpected and unexplored
principles and themes, references and faiths, we would come
closer to what Deleuze and Guattari have in mind.
We can get a better picture of how disjunctive syntheses
might reform our thinking about film by turning from the
narrative content of film to the way film looks on the silver
screen. Orson Welles’s Citizen Kane (1941) broadcast its
attention to the visual art of cinema with the introduction of
severe shot angles and framing devices never before seen. In
one especially memorable scene, the young Charles Foster
Kane’s mother signs his life away, in the foreground, against
the protestations of his father, occupying a middle ground,
while Kane himself plays in the snow in the background visible
through an open window. There are three distinct flows visible
in this one scene recorded and signed by framing devices
borrowed from the home in which the scene is shot and
marked by distinctively temporal codes. The image of the
mother framed by the room where she sits at a table is
connected to the representative of Mr. Thatcher, and Mr.
Thatcher himself by the legal document with which she signs
away the young Kane’s future. In the next room, framed by a
doorway that defines the division between him and his wife,
Kane’s father paces back and forth impotently, unable to cross
over into the space where that future is being negotiated.
Kane’s father represents an abusive past, and his wife is
taking legal action to prevent any further harm coming to her
son from his father. Young Kane, visible through a window and
against a white snow that serves as a surrogate motion picture
screen, represents the playful, outgoing present the loss of
which will haunt Kane the rest of his life. It is the recovery of
that loss (and the attempt to make that present, become past,
present again) that motivates the narrative of the film.
As viewers, where do we look in this scene? At the action in
the foreground, which is apparently the most important key to
the film’s narrative, or at the middle ground which gives what
we now call the “back story” of that narrative, or at what is
going on in the deep background, a scene apparently
irrelevant to the narrative. [9] From the point of view of the
disjunctive syntheses, the motion picture screen presents us a
surface on which all of these elements figure, inviting us to
view and connect them in unexpected ways. And what we
come to understand about the narrative of the film, as
revealed in the very end, depends on our doing so. Each
element has its own existence and each one is distinctly coded
and marked. We do not grasp them as an amalgam, a
synthesis that obliterates their distinction, but seriatim: we
can look at this or this or this and we must look at and connect
each and all of these elements, each image modified and
multiplied by its relation to the others. Kane’s playing in the
present is simultaneously a past in relation to the future being
decided for him. That future is being decided because the past
abuses of the father threaten to become present again. In an
attempt to preserve a present of play against a past of abuse,
Kane’s mother arranges a future that pushes the play into the
past and ushers in a new, present pattern of abuse.
In what philosophy do past, present and future occupy the
same time disjunctively? We certainly do not find such a time
in a philosophy committed to the idea of the present as a now
point, thick or thin, suspended between a past that has
preceded it and a future spilling out ahead of it. We do not
find it, either, in a philosophy that conceives the present as
determined by a past it retains and a future it anticipates in
the way the present moment in a melody is determined by all
the prior notes retained in it and all the successive notes it
portends. The past in the example from Citizen Kane is a
present past, the past that is present, not a fixed and distant
datum we recall only more or less completely and obligingly
but a past informed by the present, the past of this very
present moment. For so many different presents – of Kane,
Kane’s father (the past of Kane’s present), Kane’s mother (the
present of Kane’s future), Mr. Thatcher – there are so many
different pasts. Deleuze calls them “sheets of past,” using this
same example, in the second volume of his two volume study
of film. [10] The concept is developed from Henri Bergson’s
idea of a time as durée, a non-chronological duration
associated with but not subordinated to movement, associated
with the present, indivisible act of covering an infinitely
divisible space. We will take time to explore this idea in some
more detail in the discussion of the conjunctive synthesis
which we turn to now.
4. The Conjunctive Syntheses in Film
The idea of “thinking with images” is suggested in the preface
to the French edition of the first volume of Deleuze’s study of
film. “The great directors of the cinema,” Deleuze writes there,
“may be compared, in our view, not merely with painters,
architects and musicians, but also with thinkers. They think
with movement-images and time-images instead of concepts.”
[11] In short, movement-images track action and purpose,
while time-images track duration, or non-chronological time.
In general, movement-images dominate mainstream
Hollywood films, while time-images are more common in post-
war European films. On the model we are testing here,
Hollywood films and what we think about them will tend to
produce reified – static, predictable, neurotic – forms of the
unconscious. Films from the nouveau vague or neo-realist
tradition, by contrast, will exemplify the excessive, intense
consumption and consummation of desiring production
associated with the conjunctive syntheses. To see exactly what
this means and prepare some evidence in support of these
claims, let’s consider two films, a recent film firmly rooted in
the tradition of Hollywood movies and a classic new wave film
from the 1960s by the French director Jean-Luc Godard.
Clint Eastwood’s Million Dollar Baby (2004) uses the
movement-images of a fight film to think about the love and
estrangement between a father and his daughter. In the first
place, this means that Eastwood did not start out with an
abstract idea that he found or formed images to represent.
Rather, he started out with images already freighted with
ideas, specifically images from fight films, from classics like
On the Waterfront (1954), Requiem for a Heavyweight (1962)
and Raging Bull (1980) to melodramas about redemption and
missed chances for redemption, like Rocky (1976) and its
many sequels. The topology of these films is well established.
The gym is on a back street. It is barely outfitted with the
necessary equipment. It is populated with aspiring fighters,
failed fighters, trainers, managers and hangers on. The gym’s
owner has very little investment in the business, fiscally or
psychically. He has an assistant who handles the day to day
affairs of the gym, while he spends the majority of his time in
his office balancing the books and biding his time. Frankie
Dunn (Clint Eastwood) and his West Los Angeles gym appear
to fit this picture perfectly. The picture is filled out by Scrap
(Morgan Freeman), a former fighter once managed by Dunn,
who now works as Dunn’s assistant, and a cast of would be
“contenders.” Then Maggie Fitzgerald (Hilary Swank), a 31-
year-old down on her luck waitress who wants to be a fighter,
walks into Dunn’s gym.
At first, Dunn refuses to work with her, says he doesn’t work
with girls, points out how ill-prepared she is, that she can’t be
trained. But Maggie has nothing to lose, and when she
continues coming around, struggling with the basics of a heavy
bag, Scrap agrees to help her and to persuade Dunn to
manage her. Scrap knows what we don’t, that Dunn himself is
struggling with a not so basic estrangement from his daughter.
As a result, while we see the movement of action and purpose
in the film as aiming at the standard tropes of the fight film
genre, there is already something else going on. When Maggie
starts to show some promise, and Dunn begins to take an
interest in her commitment to fighting, we can still think that
this is all about the fighting, even as we begin to get some
indications that there is something beneath the surface in
Dunn’s persona. As Dunn gets closer to Maggie, helping her to
understand not just how to fight but how to live, to the point
of symbolically adopting her, giving her the nickname “mo
chuisle” (literally “my pulse,” figuratively “my darling”) and
wrapping her in that identity in the form of a fighter’s robe,
the movement of action and purpose in the film starts to look
different, starts to add up to another result.
What, if it could, would this film be trying to think about the
estrangement of affection between a father and his daughter?
Following Freud, in this variation on the Oedipus complex, the
father’s refusal of his daughter’s desire to repair her castrated
self through a sexual union with him is supposed to be
compensated by his daughter’s betrothal to another man who
stands in for him and gives her the wanted “penis child.” If his
daughter perceives that her father does not love her, however,
she may seek compensation with a man who also does not
love her and resent her father for it. A failure by the father to
navigate this rift could be the basis for such an estrangement.
Although this part of the drama is never made explicit in the
film, Eastwood leaves this possibility (and the likelihood of a
reconciliation of it) open for us. It is a Hollywood film, and
Eastwood knows its standards and its codes. In the end, this
film is not consummated in an intensity of thinking motivated
by pleasure but in a thought that affirms the traditional moral
standards and the standard end, the satisfaction of a process
of production that is a production of a desire that cannot be
satisfied. In this way, the general audience for this film is
allowed to identify with an all too familiar pattern of longing
and disappointment. In a literal representation of the death-
drive, Maggie dies because Dunn, who relieves her suffering,
becomes the hero he never was for his own daughter.
Contempt (1963), by Jean-Luc Godard openly flaunts those
standards and codes, and its irreverent and playful thinking is
more closely in concert with the productive intensity of the
conjunctive synthesis advocated by Deleuze and Guattari.
‘Contempt,’ in French le mépris, is an indistinct affect, a
disposition located somewhere between hatred and loathing.
The term is used by the French to characterize the seething,
negative underside of a lover’s quarrel, the tension, disdain
and unspoken scorn resulting not so much from a slight as
from the failure to perceive the slight and to grasp the source
of its indignity. At a central point in Godard’s film, Camille
(Brigitte Bardot) tells Paul (Michel Piccoli), “I have contempt
for you,” but it’s not at all clear that this is what the film is
about or what we should be thinking about while watching it.
Godard is apparently thinking about film in this film, about
what is implicated in making a film, and we will see that he
uses time-images to think these things, both a general time-
image of the film as a whole and specific time-images which
signal and carry out this motif.
We can say something briefly about the time-image that will
help clarify the point we want to make, here. As contrasted to
the movement-image, where the relation of action to purpose
is clear and that purpose is realized by the film’s end, nothing
happens in the time-image as it is exemplified in certain
European films. The point of these films is not linked to or
realized in purposeful action. There is nothing the action of the
film’s narrative is trying to accomplish. There is nothing to the
film but the duration, the time it takes, “a little time in its pure
state” Deleuze calls it, to get from the beginning to the end.
How, then, do these films engage us, and why do we endure
them? What pleasure can be gained from watching them?
One way they appear to engage us is by presenting images
whose optical qualities turn in on or double themselves,
establishing what Deleuze calls a circuit, a back-and-forth
relation between what is actual and virtual in that image. We
saw a version of this in Citizen Kane where the actual image of
mother, father and son turned in on itself to depict
connections between past, present and future that exposed
the solution to the mystery about the meaning of Kane’s last
word, “Rosebud.” [12] This image, functioning as a flashback,
is itself only one of several virtual doubles of the actual image
of the search for that meaning that forms the content of the
film. In Welles, as we said above, Deleuze finds a time-image
he describes as capturing the “sheets of past” that drape our
lives.
In the films of Alain Robbes-Grillet and Alain Resnais, Luis
Buñuel, and Federico Fellini, Deleuze finds another form of the
direct time-image which he characterizes as “peaks of
present.” Here, the past is present, virtually, as the past that
makes this very moment present. Here, too, the future is
virtually present as the future that makes this same moment
actually present, only in case this past and future are virtually
present in and simultaneous with it. In this time-image, three
presents (or more when the present moment is thick) are
constantly implicated and revived, Deleuze says, “revived,
contradicted, obliterated, substituted, recreated, fork and
return.” Fellini’s 8½ (1963) gives an excellent example of this
image. Amid the peaks of pasts and futures virtually present
(as memories, fantasies, dreams) and the (actual and virtual)
present demands of his wife, his lover, his producer, his crew
and his own conscience, Guido Anselmi (Marcello Mastroianni)
struggles futilely to tell the truth and learn to love. “This is a
powerful time image,” Deleuze says. It does not suppress all
narration, but, “much more importantly, it gives narration a
new value, because it abstracts it from all successive action,
as far as it replaces the movement-image with a genuine
time-image”. [13]
In such a time-image it becomes possible, even necessary, to
think – to think about the competing claims of the real and the
imaginary, about the narrative abstracted from its purpose,
about the objective and the subjective, the physical and the
mental, the actual and the virtual – as an effect of the image
itself, as an effect of a quality of the image that releases it
from what might have been its aim. It is for the sake of being
able to think “aimlessly,” without assigning a reason to the
images on the screen, that we endure these films in which
nothing happens. In these films we luxuriate in a
contemplative state produced by the direct images of time in
its pure state. In the case of Contempt, the time-image
affords us the luxury of thinking about film and film making
without compelling us to think that something is true or false
about film. It does not lead us to a correct thought, the right
thought, une idée juste, but, as Godard himself says, jusq’une
idée, just to a thought, to thinking itself.
The opening shot of Contempt makes it quite evident that
Godard is not just telling a story; he is thinking. In it we watch
(from a point on the rails laid down for a tracking or traveling
shot) as Francesca (the multi-lingual assistant to the American
producer of the film within the film) walks toward us, reading
from a soft-covered book. In this shot she is followed or
tracked by a camera, the camera man, and several assistants.
The cameraman in this shot is the principal cinematographer
of Contempt, the film about the making of a film, Raoul
Coutard. The scene we are watching Coutard shoot is an actual
piece of the film about the making of that film, Contempt.
Hence, in this opening sequence, we are watching the filming
of the filming of a film about making a film. As Francesca
walks past the picture plane and out of view, Coutard pivots
his camera and pitches it down to focus directly on our viewing
point, implicating us in the whole process. We are brought face
to face with our own one-eyed monster, our Polyphemus, and
the odyssey of Contempt begins. This is not at all incidental, of
course. The film filmed within the film is a film of Homer’s
Odyssey, and the thematic of the film about making that film
traverses the same narrative, detached from its ancient Greek
purpose.
What follows the opening sequence are several loosely
connected episodes: a scene dedicated to cataloging the
assets of Brigitte Bardot’s body [14] followed by sequences at
the bankrupt Cinecittá, at a rundown Roman villa, in an
apartment still under construction, at a second-rate dance hall
and, finally, on the island of Capri. Each episode is a sample of
the time-image, perhaps the most striking being the sequence
in the apartment, taking up the middle third of the film, where
Paul and Camille “kill time” bathing and arguing. In another
episode we visit Jeremy Prokosch (Jack Palance), the American
producer of the film within the film, who has taken up
residence at the ruined Roman villa. He has driven Camille
there from the Cinecittá studios in his two seat convertible,
leaving Paul to find a cab. The cab is waylaid, much as
Odysseus’s seaward voyage takes him off course, and when
Paul arrives he finds Camille and Prokosch walking around the
unkempt grounds. Camille is clearly, already upset. After
exchanging unpleasantries with Paul, she walks away from the
camera toward a mounded garden plot. The camera closes in
on Camille’s blond hair, in a tangle from her ride in the
convertible, and then we see, in a dizzying collage of shots,
prior scenes in the film, scenes from parts of the film we have
not yet seen, scenes not included in the film nor ever meant to
be included in it, all present before us, so many “peaks of
present” appearing in quick succession. In this image, or series
of images, which is a capsule of this episode, the virtual is
made visually actual for no other purpose than to give us
something to think and a little time, in its pure state, to think
it.
The thought that takes place in this image begins to
approximate the productive intensity of the conjunctive
synthesis Deleuze and Guattari describe as the becoming
intense of the process of desiring production. Images like
these, which appear as so many hallucinations, overwhelm us
and haunt us. They leave us neither satisfied nor wanting.
They are at once over-full and unsatisfying in the sense that
we do not know what we want from them. They do not put an
end to our thinking or our desiring. They intensify them
because their own thinking and desiring, the thought and
desire of these images, have no purpose or end. They disable
us and, in a way, distract us from the important business of
following the narrative, of solving the puzzle of what is
happening in this scene and what will happen next. And yet we
are not reduced, for this reason, to a state of helpless or
hapless inertia by these images. We find ourselves, rather,
thoughtfully engaged in them in a way that is profoundly
different from films governed by action and the movement-
image.
By the end of Contempt, as one might expect, nothing has
happened. The film of Homer’s Odyssey has not been made,
two of the main protagonists suffer a meaningless death, and
we are left, in the final shot, with a vision of an indefinite
horizon dividing the Mediterranean Sea and sky. In the course
of this general time-image, filled out by a series of loosely
connected episodes, we indulge the luxury of a non-
chronological time, a time composed of successive moments,
“peaks of presents,” in the course of which we have had time
to think about film, about the real and the represented in film,
about the odyssey of film and of making a film, in the context
of that indefinite affect, contempt, which is perhaps nothing
more than the non-chronological duration – there is no specific
point at which it begins or ends – of mixed negative feelings.
That we arrive at no specific conclusions about film or
representation or the Odyssey or contempt is of no
consequence. We have been given some time to think, and
this is what accounts for the odd sense of pleasure we feel at
the film’s end.
5. Thinking and Film
Are we right, though, to consider this thinking or this
engagement distinctly philosophical? Perhaps time-images
(and the films governed by them) keep us from thinking and
thinking philosophically, especially if we take thinking in
philosophy to be a puzzling out of the solution to a problem or
a paradox. This is not, however, what Deleuze and Guattari
would have called philosophy or thinking. [15] Finding the
solution to a problem would be, for them, just the rote
application of a protocol to a situation that yields to that
protocol in the same way that it has for as long as anyone can
remember; answering a question correctly is just the
application of the appropriate and approved procedures. For
Deleuze and Guattari, we only start thinking when these
protocols break down or when the situation is entirely alien to
us. Only then do we truly start to think, and films like
Contempt (and the time-images that compose them) appear
to make just this point. We enjoy these films because they
afford us the luxury of thinking without a purpose in mind,
without an end. This thinking is not strictly speaking “aimless;”
the concept of “aimless thought” assumes that thinking must
have a purpose. It is rather a creative engagement with what
the images on the screen have presented for our consideration
without aiming to arrive at or prove any one point or another.
In sum, on the models just enumerated, there are three levels
or planes on which philosophy has the chance of becoming a
special kind of thinking in its encounters with film. On the
plane of connective syntheses, the contents of films link flows
of narrative or conceptual detail which invite the consideration
of relationships in the film or resources for analyzing those
relationships that might not have been considered. On the
plane of disjunctive syntheses, the motion picture screen
captures and codes the images which construct that content,
inviting us to combine, inclusively, the meanings those codes
signify in ways that complicate what a film is trying to show or
say and which challenge our conceptions of time in cinema. On
the plane of conjunctive syntheses, we find that certain of
those images, time-images, are already thinking and so invite,
by an attraction that is at once subtle and seductive and
intense, a different kind of thinking. We have characterized
what it means to think in these terms by following a rubric
suggested by the distinction between connective, disjunctive
and conjunctive syntheses introduced by Deleuze and Guattari
for, admittedly, a very different purpose, and, yet, as models
for thinking in philosophy and film, that rubric has proved
illuminating.
Philosophy, as it is ordinarily conceived and practiced, adds to
film a thoughtfulness that leads to insights about various
aspects of the human condition. Philosophy, on this model,
may also add to film thoughts about the ways otherwise
unconscious aspects of that human condition are coded in the
visual images that bring us films. And still, as our analysis has
shown, there is another way of thinking that is modeled in the
time image of films inspired by a certain European tradition,
thinking for the sake of challenging the expectations that
thought arrive at some end specified for it in advance. The
point at which we no longer enjoy films of the sort that invite
us to think in this way, to think without a purpose in mind to
ends that have never been specified, is the point at which we
no longer enjoy a form of thought that takes risks with the
approved standards of truth and values and that, by thinking
differently, brings something different to what we think about
thinking in general and, perhaps, philosophy in particular.
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